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Edwards (2015) asks the reader if we are correctly modeling and measuring choosiness and 
preference functions — response curves that give the probability (y axis) that a focal individual 
will mate with a potential mate with a given phenotype (x axis). We agree that thinking about 
potential pitfalls is worthwhile. We would, however, like to offer some counterpoints that reflect 
our view that his concerns, while often technically correct, lead to headaches that abate if one 
swallows a dose of biological pragmatism.  
 
First, Edward (2015) notes that choosy individuals need not have a lower mating rate than non-
choosy ones: non-choosers might be generally less responsive so that their preference functions 
are not only flat but also vertically displaced downward relative to that of choosy individuals. 
This is possible, but when formulating a null hypothesis, it is a strange to assume that 
responsiveness covaries with the shape of preference functions. We consider it more biologically 
meaningful to remember that active mate choice typically involves rejecting some prospective 
mates. This lowers the mating rate relative to that were the same individual to mate 
indiscriminately (e.g. Johnstone et al. 1996). Indirect mate choice (Wiley & Poston 1996), not 
mentioned by Edward, offers the best counterexamples to the above rule: consider ‘hill-topping’ 
where females indirectly choose males by going to a specific location to mate. By travelling to a 
hilltop they might minimize their own time to mating. Even so, the fact that mate choice usually 
lowers the mating rate remains true — especially for species used in standard two-choice mating 
experiments (i.e. species where mate rejection occurs). 
 
Second, many of Edward’s technical arguments rely upon the complete absence of mate 
assessment by non-choosy individuals. This is ultimately untenable. The need to distinguish 
between inanimate and animate objects, between predators and conspecifics, et cetera, means 
that all animals that mate engage in mate assessment (i.e. have a minimum threshold). Otherwise 
they would spontaneously mate ‘at random’ with the world. This is not to say that mistakes are 
not made — witness male beetles in Western Australian attempting to copulate with discarded 
beer bottles (Gwynne and Rentz 1983). One can fret about the appropriateness of equating a very 
low mating threshold with being non-choosy, but excessive worrying is cured by pragmatically 
defining a frame of reference. If every (or almost every) member of the opposite sex is above an 
individual’s mating threshold, it is sensible to describe him/her as being non-choosy. The 
abstraction of potential mates that do not, but could in principle, exist is unhelpful.  
 
Individuals can mate rarely despite being non-choosy, but the opposite is unlikely: it is difficult 
to be very choosy and still mate as often as a promiscuous non-choosy individual (Kokko and 
Mappes 2013). This important asymmetry makes the non-guaranteed nature of mating rate 
reductions experienced by choosy individuals less troublesome in practice than in Edward’s 
account. We confess to fondness for the notion that costs of choosiness usually manifest as a 
lower mating rate, because many theoreticians, ourselves included, make predictions based on it. 
This is why, for example, theory predicts that (a) females are usually choosier than males (here 
mate availability differences mainly arise from sex differences in parental investment) (e.g. 
Johnstone et al. 1996); and (b) two-choice mating experiments can reveal choosiness that might 
be completely, and adaptively, absent in no-choice tests (Barry and Kokko 2010). This brings us 
to Dougherty and Shuker (2015), who investigated support for (a) and (b) with a meta-analysis of 
experimental mate choice studies. Only the latter prediction was supported. Why? 
 
We can think of a few reasons, but we focus on a key one: the analysis did not involve paired 
comparisons. Studies of males involve a different set of species than those of females. It seems 
likely that researchers conduct male choice studies on species where there is at least 
circumstantial evidence that males are choosy. This will inflate the estimated mean strength of 
male mate choice compared to that from a truly random sample of species. Similar selective 
testing is likely to occur for studies of female choice, but the bias is magnified for males if, as 
theory predicts, the true proportion of species where mate choice is weak or absent is higher for 
males than females. Extrapolating from a meta-analysis to the broader context requires care if 
there is a strong research bias (Jennions et al. 2013). In a thought experiment we might ask “Do 
mammals fly?” The more non-winged species in our sample, the smaller the effect size until the 
answer is statistically ‘no’. In this thought experiment, it is easy to identify the problem: the 
presence or absence of wings should have been included as an important modifier variable. 
Unfortunately, the source of real-world variation among species for biologically intriguing 
questions is usually far less clear. 
 
The theoretical prediction (b) was confirmed. Is the matter settled for this one question at least? 
We believe that intriguing issues still remain. Biases might confound the comparison between 
choice and no-choice experimental designs as these designs often use different criteria for choice 
(e.g. association time versus latency to mate). Also, with a choice design, if neither potential 
mate was chosen, then a trial is discarded as the test subject was sexually unresponsive rather 
than classified as rejection of both mates. In contrast, in a no-choice design, the failure to mate 
(or a pitiful performance for the behavioral proxy of mating) is often treated as mate rejection. 
Consequently, no-choice designs are systematically biased towards including data from non-
sexually responsive individuals, which underestimates the strength of sexual selection. It is 
therefore worth confirming that the difference between the two study designs persists if the meta-
analysis is confined to no-choice studies that ensured test subjects were sexually receptive.  
 
Finally, a no-choice design is a good proxy for a natural situation in which prospective mates are 
encountered sequentially, but two-choice designs are often a major simplification for species that 
often encounter numerous prospective mates simultaneously (e.g. fiddler crabs, chorusing frogs 
and insects, lekking birds and mammals). Given that experimental data suggests that the number 
of mates can affect mate choice decisions (Hutchinson 2005), we are unlikely to run out of 
intriguing study questions any time soon. 
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